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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In August 1944, twenty-two year old Martha Klein was seized by German 
troops in Hungary and forced to move to Austria where she was taken by 
train to Ravensbruck, a notorious women’s concentration camp.1  She was 
forced to live “in a wooden barracks [without] light, heat, insulation from 
rain, running water, or sewage facilities.”2  Two thousand five hundred 
women were expected to share one latrine and one washroom.3  Martha had 
to sleep with three other women in wooden bunks stacked three tiers high.4  
The women were only provided with a “bowl of watery potato-skin and grass 
soup each day and a slice of bread twice a week.”5  After waking up at 4:00 
a.m., Martha was expected to stand at attention for roll call for hours before 
being shipped off to Siemens’ Ravensbruck factory for heavy labor, 
manufacturing electronics and communications equipment for the German 
Reich.6   
The German government refused any compensation or reparation for 
Martha and thousands of other surviving forced and slave laborers after 
World War II.7  Over forty years later, Martha brought suit in federal court in 
New Jersey.  Unfortunately, the judge dismissed her claim because of 
international policy implications the judge deemed out of his purview.8 
Martha’s story is not unusual.  Thousands of surviving slave and forced 
laborers from many countries had similar experiences.9  Should forced 
laborers for private German companies be compensated for their labor in 
light of the gross human rights violations they suffered?  The International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) recently decided a case examining this issue.10 
On February 3, 2012, the ICJ published its much anticipated opinion 
regarding jurisdictional immunity11 from claims of severe human rights 
                                                                                                                                                       
 1 Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 253 (D.N.J. 1999). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 See id. at 284 (noting that plaintiffs argued the established German legislation did not 
provide adequate compensation). 
 9 See, e.g., Princz v. Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Frumkin v. J.A. Jones, Inc., 
129 F. Supp. 2d 370 (D.N.J. 2001); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 461 
(D.N.J. 1999); Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999); Fishel v. 
BASF Grp., 175 F.R.D. 525 (S.D. Iowa 1998). 
 10 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening), Judgment, 2012 
I.C.J. 143 (Feb. 3). 
 11 Jurisdictional immunity refers to the protection a state is given from a suit being brought 
against it in another state’s courts. 
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violations arising during World War II between September 1943 and May 
1945.12  The court ruled for Germany, finding that (1) civil claims could not 
be brought in Italy against Germany for war crimes committed by the 
German army against Italian nationals, (2) Italy was not allowed to 
confiscate a German-owned building located in Italy, and used for non-
commercial purposes, to satisfy a default judgment in an Italian court against 
Germany, and (3) judgments obtained in Greece against Germany were not 
enforceable in Italian courts.13  This Note examines this decision and its 
implications. 
First, this Note will address the historical background of restitution to 
victims after World War II, including previous international human rights 
cases in Italy regarding jurisdictional immunity.  Second, this note will 
explain this specific case, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. 
Italy: Greece Intervening), and will summarize the ICJ’s findings.  The last 
section will analyze the potential effect of this ruling on future armed 
conflicts and examine whether damages imposed  sixty years after the fact 
are an effective deterrent against future use of forced labor during armed 
conflicts.  This section will also analyze the limitations of this ruling and the 
dangers of allowing the ICJ to determine the scope of jurisdictional 
immunity rather than an international governing body, such as the United 
Nations (UN). 
II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Italy joined World War II in June 1940 on the side of Germany but 
surrendered to the Allies and declared war on Germany in September 1943, 
when Mussolini was removed from power.14  Much of Italy was still 
occupied by German forces, which massacred and deported many Italian 
civilians.15  Germany also took many Italian forces captive, used them as 
forced labor, and denied them prisoner of war status that would have allowed 
them to receive compensation.16  During the war, Germany used 
approximately 10 million forced laborers in practically every aspect of 
society, from schools and hospitals to industry and the Schutzstaffel 
(Germany’s version of the Secret Service; also known as the “S.S.”).17 
                                                                                                                                                       
 12 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. 143. 
 13 Id. ¶¶ 107, 120, 133.  
 14 GERHARD L. WEINBERG, A WORLD AT ARMS: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II, at 
132–33, 616 (1994). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. ¶ 21. 
 17 Patricia Chappine, Delayed Justice: Forced and Slave Labor Restitution After the 
Holocaust, 46 J. ECUMENICAL STUD. 616, 616 (2011). 
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A.  Early Restitution 
While the world initially confronted Germany’s crimes against humanity 
in the Nuremburg Trials of 1945, these trials focused on punishing criminal 
behavior and not on providing restitution to victims of forced labor and 
concentration camps.18  A discussion about compensation for victims was 
first initiated by Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the Federal 
Republic of Germany (West Germany) in 1949.19  The first compensation 
payment was offered to Israel in 1949:  Deutsche Mark 10 Million “as a first 
direct token that the injustice done to the Jews all over the world has to be 
made good.”20  The following year, the Luxembourg Agreements arranged 
for West Germany to pay approximately DM 100B to 500,000 Israeli 
Holocaust survivors internationally.21  While these payments were 
unprecedented, many victims were left with nothing because West Germany 
would not pay victims in Communist countries.22  These agreements also 
ignored forced or slave laborers because they were deemed to be reparations 
under international law and thus were not to be dealt with until after 
Germany was unified so the country would have an opportunity to recover 
economically.23 
Germany became a party to many statutory agreements and treaties 
addressing claims by victims of human rights violations.24  German property 
was originally seized, but this seizure was terminated in 1946.25  However, 
the Agreement Respecting Distribution of German Reparation: 
Establishment of Inter-Allied Reparation Agency and Restitution of 
Monetary Gold still obligated Germany to make reparations for Nazi 
persecution with the amount dependent on Germany’s ability to pay.26  The 
1953 Agreement on German External Debts (the London Agreement) 
delayed discussion of these reparations, tolling claims until a final peace 
treaty was concluded.27  The London Agreement was vague on whether 
                                                                                                                                                       
 18 Id. (citing CHRISTIAN PROSS, PAYING FOR THE PAST: THE STRUGGLE OVER REPARATIONS 
FOR SURVIVING VICTIMS OF THE NAZI TERROR, at viii (1998)).  
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 617 (quoting MARILYN HENRY, CONFRONTING THE PERPETRATORS: A HISTORY OF 
THE CLAIMS CONFERENCE 5 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id.  
 24 See infra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
 25 Agreement Respecting Distribution of German Reparation, Establishment of Inter-Allied 
Reparation Agency and Restitution of Monetary Gold, Jan. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 3157, 444 
U.N.T.S. 69. 
 26 Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation, 
May 26, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 4411, 332 U.N.T.S. 219. 
 27 Agreement on German External Debts, Feb. 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 443, 333 U.N.T.S. 3 
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“reparations” by private parties were to be included.28  In 1953, West 
Germany initiated a discussion of reparations for individuals and authorized 
payments to persecuted people under the Federal Compensation Law 
Concerning Victims of National Socialist Persecution 
(Bundesentschädigungsgesetz (BEG)).29  However, this law did not include 
forced laborers in part because many were not considered victims of National 
Socialist persecution.30  Many forced laborers were also denied compensation 
because they lacked the necessary territorial link to Germany.31 
Germany’s unification in 1989 revived the potential for reparations for 
previously uncompensated forced laborers.32   Lawsuits by private parties 
against Germany proliferated after a German trial court held on November 5, 
1997 that the limitations period for forced labor cases was indeed tolled33 by 
the London Agreement until after Germany was unified.34  However, these 
claims were no longer tolled after the Two Plus Four Treaty35 became 
effective on March 15, 1991.36  The “Two Plus Four Treaty” fashioned 
German unification by providing a legal foundation and was viewed as a de 
facto peace treaty.37  Moreover, the German Constitutional Court provided 
dicta from a ruling on May 13, 1996 indicating that, while public reparations 
for forced labor were barred, private parties could still assert claims for 
compensation.38  Thus, a flood of litigation ensued as people who had not 
been given official compensation and were not afforded the ability to file 
                                                                                                                                                       
[hereinafter The London Agreement]; see also Detlev Vagts & Peter Murray, Litigating the 
Nazi Labor Claims: The Path Not Taken, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503, 507 (2002). 
 28 Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 507. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Paul Christoph Bornkamm, State Immunity Against Claims Arising From War Crimes: 
The Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Jurisdictional Immunities of the 
State, 13 GER. L.J. 773, 774 (2012); see also Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. 
It.), Counter-Memorial of Italy, 2009 I.C.J. 143, ¶ 2.24 (Dec. 22) (explaining that the 
territorial link exception of the BEG denied compensation to persecutees who lived outside of 
Germany when it was enacted in 1953).  
 31 Bornkamm, supra note 30, at 774.  
 32 Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 508. 
 33 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1525 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “toll” as “to stop the 
running of”). 
 34 Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 508. 
 35 Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (with Agreed Minute), Sept. 12, 
1990, 1696 U.N.T.S. 124. 
 36 Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 508. 
 37 Anja Hense, Limitation of Economic Damages as a ‘Humanitarian Gesture’: The 
German Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future,’ 46 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 
407, 410–11 (2011). 
 38 Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 508–09 (citing Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 
[Federal Constitutional Court] 1996, 94 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 
[BVerfGE] 315, 330 (Ger.)). 
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claims under German law were now filing claims, both in Germany and 
around the world. 
B.  Litigation of Forced Labor Claims 
Former forced laborers saw an opportunity after the German 
Constitutional Court implied that individual compensation claims for forced 
labor could be asserted individually against Germany and German companies 
in German courts.39  Private companies such as Ford Werke, Volkswagen 
AG, Siemens, Krupp, Daimler-Benz (now Daimler-Chrysler), and Bayer AG 
were facing immense class action suits, especially in the United States.40  
Even though many potential plaintiffs were still barred from bringing their 
claims and litigants faced many difficulties, private German industry was 
fearful of the economic consequences of litigation.41 
Many potential plaintiffs were still barred from bringing suit in the United 
States for several reasons.  The history of the class action suits filed in the 
United States exemplifies many of these problems.  First, people who were 
forced to work for the German government could not bring suit under the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity codified in the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976.42  However, the only current private company that 
could avoid a class action under this doctrine is Volkswagen because it was 
owned by the Labor Front of the Reich, a branch of the Nazi party, during 
World War II and was not privatized until 1960.43   
Second, plaintiffs were unable to bring a claim if the company they 
labored for during the war no longer existed and was unable to make 
reparation payments.44  This concern was especially great as over fifty years 
had passed, and the second half of the twentieth century was a tumultuous 
time for industry.45  Additionally, many forced laborers worked for 
individual employers who had died or partnerships that had dissolved.46  
Furthermore, many German companies have no presence in the United States 
that would expose them to liability and are therefore judgment-proof in U.S. 
courts.47 
                                                                                                                                                       
 39 Hense, supra note 37, at 411. 
 40 Id.; Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 509. 
 41 Hense, supra note 37, at 411; Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 509. 
 42 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611.  See, e.g., 
Sampson v. Germany, 250 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir. 2001); Princz v. Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994). 
 43 Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 510 (internal citation omitted). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id.  
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 511. 
782  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 41:775 
 
Lastly, many plaintiffs would have been precluded from bringing suit 
because of postwar peace treaties.48  Most peace treaties, including Italy’s, 
prohibited claims by nationals against the German state and German 
nationals.49  Although the original intent was to prevent United States funds 
for German recovery from disappearing abroad, these agreements prohibited 
forced laborers from receiving any compensation.50 
Even those plaintiffs who were able to bring claims faced a long, difficult, 
and costly litigation process.  The first major procedural hurdle was the 
running of the statute of limitations.51  Most plaintiffs relied on the 1953 
London Agreement to toll claims for private individuals.52  However, even 
this posed a problem as the English and German versions of the treaty (both 
held to be official) differed.  The tolling language in the English version 
stated that “[c]onsideration of claims arising out of the second World 
War . . . against the Reich and agencies of the Reich . . . shall be deferred 
until the final settlement of the problem of reparation.”53  Instead of merely 
referring to “the Reich and agencies of the Reich,” the German version stated 
“Reich und im Auftrag des Reichs handelnde Stellen und Personen,” which 
translates to “The Reich and offices and person acting at the behest of the 
Reich.”54  The English version of the statute only tolled claims against 
Germany and German agencies while the German version also included 
those acting at the request of the government.55  Additionally, even if the 
London Agreement tolled the statute of limitations, German courts have held 
that the Two Plus Four Treaty ended the tolling of the statute of limitations.56  
Thus, the statute of limitations would have resumed in 1991.57   
A final issue regarding the statute of limitations involved determining the 
exact limitations period and which law applies when a claim is not brought in 
the state in which the cause of action occurred—the law of the forum state or 
the law where the cause of action arose.  One U.S. judge decided this issue in 
favor of the law of the forum state, applying New Jersey, Michigan, or 
Delaware statutes of limitations on unjust enrichment, which provide for a 
statute of limitations of three or six years.58  Thus, even though this issue was 
                                                                                                                                                       
 48 Id. at 512.  
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 514–15. 
 52 The London Agreement, supra note 27. 
 53 Id. art. 5(2). 
 54 Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 515 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 55 Id. at 516. 
 56 See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing tolling of statute of limitations). 
 57 See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing tolling of statute of limitations). 
 58 Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 472–75 (D.N.J. 1999) (implying that 
victims are only allowed to bring suit within the statute of limitation for the state they are in). 
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resolved in the United States, the resulting statute of limitations is still 
unpredictable as it varies based on the forum state. 
Not only were victims unaware of whether the statute of limitations 
prevents their claims, but their claims also may have been precluded by 
foreign policy.  The United States Supreme Court first recognized this as a 
defense in Underhill v. Hernandez,59 by finding for the defendant, a 
Venezuelan general acting on behalf of the government.60  German 
companies could argue that the German Reich took people from their homes 
and determined their paltry living conditions, not the private companies who 
merely used their labor.  Because judges are often reluctant to get involved in 
international affairs and view this as an issue that should be resolved among 
the respective governments, they tend use any possible means to dismiss the 
claims.61 
A third problem litigants faced was difficulty certifying an appropriate 
class.62  While many of the cases in the United States purported to include 
anyone forced to work for a defendant firm, it was difficult to find that there 
were “common questions of fact and law” that “predominate[d] over any 
questions affecting only individual members.”63  There were obvious 
differences in the plaintiffs’ status, working and living conditions, and 
location, making it difficult for them to be certified as a class under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.64 
A final problem was substantive; victims often struggled to provide 
sufficient proof to prevent dismissal of the claim.65  Many companies were 
not clearly marked with corporate logos; many records were destroyed; and 
often heirs bringing the claim relied on inadmissible hearsay evidence.66  
                                                                                                                                                       
 59 168 U.S. 250 (1897).  
 60 Id. (holding that where a U.S. citizen was detained in Venezuela by a general in military 
control of Bolívar, the U.S. citizen was not entitled to compensation because the general’s acts 
were those of the Venezuelan government and not subject to jurisdiction in U.S. courts as a 
matter of foreign relations). 
 61 See, e.g., Frumkin v. J.A. Jones, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 370 (D.N.J. 2001) (dismissing the 
case under the political question doctrine and the doctrine of international comity); Iwanowa, 67 
F. Supp. 2d at 461 (dismissing the case because of the tolling of the statute of limitations); 
Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248  (D.N.J. 1999) (dismissing the case under the 
political question doctrine); Fishel v. BASF Grp., 175 F.R.D. 525 (S.D. Iowa 1998) (dismissing 
the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants); Princz v. Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (dismissing the case under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). 
 62 Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 519. 
 63 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 64 Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 520–23; FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 65 Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 527–28.  
 66 Id. 
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Thus, it was extremely difficult for a plaintiff to prevail, as U.S. judges 
dismissed cases for a variety of substantive and procedural reasons.67 
Despite these difficulties and the fact that many plaintiffs were still barred 
by the statute of limitations, German companies wanted to avoid the major 
financial risks associated with large class action suits.  Companies were 
afraid such cases would damage their public image in the United States, in 
turn damaging the business of their subsidiaries.68  Furthermore, a loss in 
court could be especially damaging, as preclusion would lead to losses in 
other cases as well.69   
Liability concerns were especially important in the 1990s when these 
claims were being brought.  That decade was an extremely competitive time 
for international industry, and many German companies were planning major 
expansions in the United States.70  German companies did not know whether 
the legal actions would lead to sanctions or legislative measures taken in the 
United States.  German industries were afraid these potential claims could 
hang over their heads indefinitely, leading to risk and uncertainty in the 
market.71  Germany and the United States entered into talks about a potential 
collective compensation settlement that would provide “ ‘legal closure’, 
which was seen as an indispensable condition for any payments to former 
slave and forced laborers.”72 
C.  The German Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future’ 
Even though Germany had already paid out an estimated sum of $100 
billion to victims since World War II, Germany sought legal closure for itself 
and its private companies through the establishment of the foundation 
Erinnerung, Verantwortung, Zukunft73 (the Foundation), which promised an 
additional $5 billion to over one million survivors of forced labor.74  The 
terms of the Foundation were negotiated by representatives from the United 
States, Germany, other European countries, the Jewish Claims Conference, 
                                                                                                                                                       
 67 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 61.  
 68 Hense, supra note 37, at 412. 
 69 See 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4402 (2d ed. 1987) (explaining the effects of preclusion on subsequent claims). 
 70 For example, VW was about to introduce the Beetle; Daimler-Benz was about to merge 
with Chrysler; and Siemens was heavily investing in American expansion.  See Hense, supra 
note 37, at 412. 
 71 Id. at 413. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Erinnerung, Verantwortung, Zukunft translates to Remembrance, Responsibility, Future. 
 74 William Drozdiak, Germany Creates Fund to Pay Forced Laborers, WASH. POST, July 
18, 2000, at A3, available at 2000 WLNR 9051839. 
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and the German Economy Foundation Initiative.75  Corporate contributions 
were capped at 1% to 1.5% of their annual sales for each company, 
irrespective of their gains from the use of forced labor.76  This gave the 
corporations a reprieve from the economic threat of major class action 
lawsuits, while only imposing a minimum economic burden on a miniscule 
percentage of their annual sales.77 
The German Parliament (Bundestag) passed a law establishing the 
Foundation with funds from the government and private companies in 
August of 2000.78  The law provided that Germany could declare legal peace 
when all litigation in the United States was dismissed.79  Once peace was 
declared on May 30, 2001 and all litigation was dismissed in the United 
States, certain provisions of the Foundation law were activated, and 
payments began the next month.80  The law was supposed to be the 
“exclusive avenue to recovery from the German government or German 
industry for injuries arising out of the Nazi labor program,”81 but there was 
still litigation pending in other countries, besides the United States, for those 
still excluded from Foundation payments or those not willing to accept a 
small settlement.82     
While many appreciated the apology and acceptance of responsibility by 
German President Johnannes Rau,83 the Foundation unfortunately did not 
provide the comprehensive relief it promised.  First, claims had to be filed 
within one year and payments were capped at DM 15,000 for slave laborers 
and at DM 5,000 for forced laborers.84  Furthermore, these maximum 
payments were reserved for only the most aggrieved in each group, as there 
were insufficient funds for all victims.85   
Second, many of the requirements were difficult to prove, such as the 
requirement that anyone who suffered property loss had to prove that their 
property or bank accounts were “confiscated with essential, direct, and harm-
causing collaboration of German enterprises,” and that value was then 
                                                                                                                                                       
 75 Hense, supra note 37, at 415. 
 76 Id. at 423. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Libby Adler & Peer Zumbansen, The Forgetfulness of Noblesse: A Critique of the 
German Foundation Law Compensating Slave and Forced Laborers of the Third Reich, 39 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 1, 3 (2002). 
 79 Id. at 4. 
 80 Id. at 4, 22. 
 81 Id. at 22. 
 82 Hense, supra note 37, at 423. 
 83 Chappine, supra note 17, at 620. 
 84 Adler & Zumbansen, supra note 78, at 14, 22. 
 85 Hense, supra note 37, at 420. 
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transferred into what is today German territory.86  This was difficult for 
victims to prove, as many bank records were not meticulously kept during 
the war and many were destroyed.87    
Additionally, the Foundation excluded anyone who had been a prisoner of 
war, unless they were in a concentration camp or part of another specific 
group, because prisoners of war “may, according to the rules of international 
law, be put to work by the detaining power.”88  Despite previously denying 
former Italian military internees prisoner-of war status, the German 
government denied them compensation under the Foundation because they 
were, in fact, prisoners of war and therefore no public international law gave 
them an individual right of compensation for forced labor.89  In this way, the 
German government suddenly changed their terminology to avoid 
compensating victims. 
D.  Previous Developments and Cases in Italy and Greece 
The case history from the United States resembles the case history in 
other countries, except other countries did not drop all pending cases after 
the adoption of the Foundation as the United States did.90  At that time cases 
were still pending in Italy, and the Italian court had to determine whether it 
would grant Germany immunity.   
While Italy has no specific legislation regarding foreign states’ immunity, 
Italian courts have slowly restricted immunity regarding acts of a foreign 
state that are viewed as acta iure imperii91 in civil cases where plaintiffs were 
victims of serious humanitarian law violations.92  The Italian courts do this 
through a jus cogens93 exception, discussed in the Ferrini case and its 
progeny. 
The Ferrini case was revolutionary, as it provided a new avenue through 
which Italian victims could seek justice.94  In that case, the court held for the 
                                                                                                                                                       
 86 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening), Judgment, 2012 
I.C.J. 143, ¶ 26 (Feb. 3).  
 89 Id. ¶¶ 21, 26.  
 90 Adler & Zumbansen, supra note 78, at 4, 22. 
 91 Acta jure imperii are acts that are “[an] exercise of sovereign power.” Ryszard 
Piotrowicz, The State of State Immunity: Germany Defeats Italy at the ICJ, 86 AUSTL. L.J. 
230, 230 (2012). 
 92 Elena Sciso, Italian Judges’ Point of View on Foreign States’ Immunity, 44 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1201, 1201 (2011). 
 93 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining jus cogens as “a mandatory or 
peremptory norm of general international law accepted and recognized by the international 
community as a norm from which no derogation is permitted”). 
 94 Christian Tomuschat, The International Law of State Immunity and Its Development by 
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first time that Germany could not rely on sovereign immunity as a defense 
when a grave human rights violation occurred on Italian soil.95  The plaintiff, 
Luigi Ferrini, was captured by the German army in Arezzo, Italy, on August 
4, 1944, when he was twenty-eight years old.96  He was deported to Germany 
and forced to work in the armaments industry.97  In 1998, he filed a claim 
with the Court of Arezzo (Tribunale di Arezzo), which rejected his claim 
based on a lack of jurisdiction.98  The Court of Appeal of Florence (Corte di 
Appello di Firenze) affirmed the lower court’s ruling in January 2002.99  
Later, the Italian Court of Cassation (Corte di Cassazione) granted his claim 
because the “conduct of [Germany] amount[ed] to an international crime that 
infringes universal values of the international community as a whole and 
rules of jus cogens.”100 
Even though no other country follows the Ferrini precedent, including 
appellate courts in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom,101 Italy 
upheld this decision in a line of cases decided in 2008.102  On May 29, 2008, 
the Court of Cassation held in fourteen cases that “states accused of 
international crimes do not enjoy immunity from civil jurisdiction in other 
states’ courts under customary international law.”103  While acknowledging 
there was no specific exception for denying foreign states immunity for acts 
jure imperii that violated jus cogens, the Court did note that “a principle 
restricting the immunity of a state that has committed crimes against 
humanity can be presumed to be in the process of emerging.”104  It went on to 
hold that Germany was not immune from suit because of the particular 
circumstances of extremely egregious human rights violations originating in 
Italy, not in Germany.105  In this way, Italy prevented Germany from 
claiming sovereign immunity for violations committed in Italy.  
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However, there were a few differences between Ferrini and the Court of 
Cassation’s rulings in 2008.  First, deportation and forced labor were no 
longer referred to as “war crimes,” but in the later cases were designated as 
“crimes against humanity.”106  Second, the 2008 cases did not refer to the 
statute of limitations or jurisdiction in a civil suit.107  Lastly, the fact that 
these crimes originated in the forum state was treated as an aside in the 2008 
cases, rather than a central argument as in Ferrini.108  These changes made it 
easier for other forced laborers to file suit against Germany in Italy. 
III.  CASE ANALYSIS 
On December 23, 2008, Germany filed proceedings against Italy with the 
ICJ, alleging that Italy violated Germany’s sovereign immunity by allowing 
civil claims for human rights violations that occurred during World War II 
from September 1943 to May 1945.109   
Germany also claimed Italy violated its sovereign immunity by enforcing 
Greek judgments in Italy and confiscating Villa Vigoni, German state 
property, to pay the Greek judgments.110  Italy counter-claimed for 
reparations owed to Italian victims for violations of international 
humanitarian law, but this claim was dismissed by the ICJ on July 6, 2010 
because it was outside the jurisdiction on the court.111  Although Italy failed 
to contest the dismissal, the ICJ did in fact have jurisdiction over the claim 
under Article 1 of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes, which became enforceable on April 18, 1961, as the claim clearly 
related to an “international legal dispute” between two states.112  
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A.  Greek Judgments Enforced in Italy 
On June 10, 1944, German forces occupying Greece entered the Greek 
village of Distomo, massacred over 200 innocent Greek civilians, and burned 
the village in revenge for an attack on an SS unit.113  Relatives of the victims 
filed a claim against Germany for compensation on November 27, 1995 
before the Court of First Instance of Livadia, Greece.114  The court entered a 
default judgment against Germany two years later on September 25, 1997 for 
approximately $30 million, stating that Germany did not have jurisdictional 
immunity for a breach of jus cogens, such as gross rights violations.115  Three 
years later the Hellenic Supreme Court of Greece dismissed Germany’s 
appeal on the grounds that it lacked jurisdictional immunity.116  However, the 
judgment was not enforced because the Greek Minister of Justice refused the 
authorization required under Article 923 of the Greek Code of Civil 
Procedure.117  
Because both Greece and Germany refused to comply with the court’s 
ruling, the plaintiffs resorted to other means of recovery for their tort claims.  
First, they applied to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).118  The 
ECHR held that Germany had sovereign immunity, so the plaintiffs’ claim 
that Germany and Greece violated Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was 
inadmissible.119  Next, the plaintiffs tried to recover in Germany, but the 
German courts refused to recognize the default judgments because they were 
in violation of Germany’s sovereign immunity.120  After this failure, the 
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Greek plaintiffs tried to recover in Italy following the Ferrini decision.121  On 
May 22, 2005, the Court of Appeal of Florence held that the judgment was 
enforceable in Italy for the plaintiffs’ judgment on the merits, as well as their 
legal expenses.122  On January 12, 2011, the Italian Court of Cassation upheld 
the lower courts’ rulings.123   
Meanwhile, on June 7, 2007, the Greek Claimants levied a legal charge 
claiming ownership of the Villa Vigoni, a German state property near Lake 
Como.124  However, judgment against the property was stayed under Decree-
Law No. 63 of April 28, 2010, Law No. 98 of June 23, 2010, and Decree-
Law No. 216 of December 29, 2011 because of pending applications before 
the ICJ.125 
Germany requested the ICJ find that Italy violated Germany’s sovereign 
immunity by allowing civil claims to be brought in Italy against Germany, by 
taking measures against German state property located in Italy, and by 
declaring Greek judgments enforceable in Italy.126 
B.  Italy’s Arguments and the ICJ’s Decisions 
While Germany admits that its conduct was unlawful,127 it does not 
believe there should be unlimited liability for its leaders, as that would lead 
to “incalculable financial dimensions” involving the “thousands or perhaps 
even millions of victims” of the conflict.128  To determine whether there was 
financial liability for the human rights violations, the ICJ applied customary 
international law (CIL),129 which requires “a settled practice” and supporting 
court opinions.130  The ICJ spends the majority of its decision discussing 
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Italy’s arguments against granting sovereign immunity for civil claims 
brought in Italy.  Next, the ICJ discusses the issues of constraining German 
state property in Italy and the enforceability of Greek judgments in Italy.131 
1.  Italy’s Arguments Against Granting Germany Sovereign Immunity for 
Civil Claims Brought in Italy 
The ICJ first considered whether Italy erred in denying Germany 
sovereign immunity for the civil claims brought in Italy on the following 
grounds: (1) under CIL, immunity for an acte jure imperii does not extend to 
a tort committed in the forum state (the territorial tort principle); and (2) 
regardless of where the act happened, no state should be entitled to immunity 
where there are severe violations of international humanitarian law with no 
other prospect of redress.132 
The ICJ did not find that the territorial tort principle granted immunity 
under CIL because the civil claims were viewed as acte jure imperii.133  They 
dismissed this argument and found against the Italian forced laborers.134  The 
territorial tort principle originally arose in the context of insurable risks, such 
as traffic accidents with foreign state vehicles, and is usually limited to acta 
jure gestionis.135  The reasoning behind this limitation—that insurance 
companies should not be able to benefit from the state’s immunity—does not 
apply to war-time claims where no insurance is involved.136  Additionally, the 
Court found no other country extended the territorial tort to war damages 
except for the Ferrini line of cases in Italy and the recent Distomo case in 
Greece.137  While denying Italy’s territorial tort argument, the ICJ left open 
the issue of whether granting immunity for acta jure imperrii in general, 
besides those committed during wartime, was part of CIL.138 
Next, the ICJ evaluated Italy’s argument that Germany should not be 
given sovereign immunity for civil claims involving severe human rights 
violations.139  Italy’s argument can be divided into three parts—the gravity of 
the violation, the presence of a jus cogens exception, and the last resort 
argument.140 
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First, the ICJ considered whether the gravity of the violation should 
deprive Germany of immunity.141  The Court determined that the gravity of 
the offense should not influence a determination of immunity.142  Making 
jurisdictional immunity turn on the gravity of the claim would require the 
national court to make a judgment on the merits of gravity before 
determining jurisdiction.143  This would allow immunity to be refuted by a 
careful drafting of the claim and could potentially eliminate sovereign 
immunity in all tort claims.144  Although this would push the court towards 
upholding immunity, the ICJ also looked to CIL and found no gravity 
limitation in the European Convention, the United Nations Convention, or 
the draft of the Inter-American Convention.145   
Next, the court decided whether the jus cogens violations by Germany 
conflicted with sovereign immunity.146  However, the ICJ has previously held 
that a jus cogens violation does not confer jurisdiction that a court would not 
otherwise possess.147  Thus, even if the acts alleged in Italian court were 
violations of jus cogens, CIL for sovereign immunity would still not be 
affected.148   
Lastly, the ICJ addressed Italy’s argument that the complaint in Italian 
courts was the victims’ “last resort” for any compensation.149  While the ICJ 
noted that Germany has taken steps to make reparations, it expressed 
“regret” that Germany still excludes the majority of Italian military prisoners, 
having denied them prisoner-of-war status at the relevant time and then later 
viewed them as prisoners-of-war (making them ineligible for later 
reparations).150  However as unfortunate that may be, the ICJ did not see any 
basis in CIL for denying immunity because there is no “effective alternative 
means of securing redress.”151  The ICJ did not find any of these three 
arguments, taken individually or jointly, sufficient to deny Germany 
sovereign immunity from civil claims in Italy, and thus held that Italy had 
wrongly denied Germany the immunity to which it was entitled under CIL.152  
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2.  Italy’s Arguments Against Germany’s Sovereign Immunity in 
Satisfying a Judgment from a Foreign State 
Second, the ICJ considered Italy’s claim that it should not grant Germany 
sovereign immunity in regards to actions taken against the Villa Vigoni, a 
German state property in Italy, because CIL does not provide immunity from 
such actions.153  The court noted that CIL governing enforcement immunity 
is broader than jurisdictional immunity.154  A state may waive its 
jurisdictional immunity without waiving its right to enforcement immunity.155  
Thus, the ICJ can rule on enforcement immunity without determining 
whether the Greek court violated Germany’s sovereign, jurisdictional 
immunity.156  Germany argued that the United Nations Convention has 
codified CIL in Article 19, which states that  
no post-judgment measure of constraint . . . against property of 
a State may be taken in connection with a proceeding before a 
court of another State unless and except . . . (a) the State has 
expressly consented to the taking . . . (b) the State has allocated 
or earmarked property for the satisfaction of the claim . . . or 
(c) it has been established that the property . . . [is used] for 
other than government non-commercial purposes and is in the 
territory of the State of the forum. . . .157 
The ICJ held that it is clear Germany uses the Villa Vigoni for non-
commercial governmental purposes and therefore Italy has violated 
Germany’s sovereign immunity under CIL by taking measures against the 
Villa Vigoni.158 
3. Italy’s Arguments in Favor of the Enforceability of Greece’s 
Judgments in Italy 
 Lastly, the ICJ examined whether Italy should have enforced Greece’s 
judgments or granted Germany sovereign immunity.159  The Court noted that 
this was a difficult question distinct from the other two above.160  This 
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question turns on whether a third state can enforce a judgment from a court 
in one foreign state against the government of another, where that foreign 
court has examined the sovereign immunity of the foreign state.161  The ICJ 
considered whether Italy respected Germany’s sovereign immunity by 
initiating exequatur proceedings against Germany.162  However, by 
instituting these proceedings, Italy exercised jurisdiction over Germany and 
the Italian courts should have determined whether they would have been 
qualified to hear the claim in the first place.163  The ICJ held that it did not 
matter whether Greece had jurisdiction over Germany.  The fact that Italy 
would not have had jurisdiction over Germany was sufficient.  Germany was   
entitled to sovereign immunity.164 
To summarize, the ICJ held that Italy violated Germany’s sovereign 
immunity by allowing civil claims for violations of international 
humanitarian law committed by the German Reich between 1943 and 1945, 
by “taking ‘measures of constraint’ against the Villa Vigoni,” and by 
enforcing Greek judgments for the German Reich’s violations of 
international humanitarian law in Greece.165  Additionally, the ICJ held that 
Italy must ensure its decisions contrary to this ruling are rendered 
ineffective.166 
C.  Dissents 
Three judges, Judge Yusuf, Judge ad hoc Gaja (appointed by Italy), and 
Judge Cançado Trindade, filed dissenting opinions.  Judge Yusuf disagreed 
with the majority’s focus on “whether . . . immunity is applicable to acts 
committed by the armed forces of a State . . . in the course of conducting an 
armed conflict.”167  Instead, Judge Yusuf focused on Italy’s argument that 
Germany has an obligation to make reparations for international human 
rights violations where the victims have no other means of redress.168   
Judge Yusuf relied on principles of international humanitarian law found 
in documents such as a United Nations General Assembly resolution, which 
provides a victim of a gross violation of international human rights law with 
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“access to an effective judicial remedy.”169  He noted that courts are slowly 
eroding sovereign immunity by creating exceptions to jurisdictional 
immunity, “such as the tort exception, the employment exception, and the 
intellectual property exception.”170  Because these victims did not have 
access to any other means of redress, Judge Yusuf found no violation of 
Germany’s sovereign immunity.171 
Judge ad hoc Gaja disagreed with the majority’s view that the territorial 
tort principle does not apply to human rights violations committed by hostile 
armed forces in the forum state’s territory.172  He noted that just because 
military activities may injure people en masse does not mean they should be 
exempt from jurisdiction.173  While Judge ad hoc Gaja indicated he would not 
support an exception from jurisdiction for torts perpetrated outside the forum 
state,174 he did not find that every exercise of jurisdiction by the Italian courts 
was a breach of sovereign immunity under international law.175 
Lastly, Judge Cançado Trindade, former President of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, wrote a lengthy dissent detailing his disagreement 
with all of the majority’s holdings.176  In his concluding twenty-six point 
summary of his argument, he noted that state immunity is a privilege and 
cannot be an abstraction of international law.177  The law should be human-
centered, not state-centered.178  Judge Cançado Trindade did not want a state 
to be able to murder its own population or that of another state and then 
simply claim sovereign immunity to avoid liability, as sovereign immunity 
was not designed for that purpose.179  Judge Cançado Trindade also noted 
that because these acts were violations of jus cogens, the distinction between 
acte jure gestionis and acte jure imperii is irrelevant, as that distinction was 
not meant to provide immunity for clear violations of international 
humanitarian law.180 
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IV.  ANALYSIS AND CASE IMPLICATIONS 
The issues surrounding reparations for gross human rights violations 
during World War II are still being litigated over sixty years after the fact.  
First, Germany’s reparations and Foundation program were clearly 
insufficient and used technicalities in labeling to avoid compensating certain 
groups of victims.181  Second, the ICJ appears to be shying away from the 
current trend of restrictive immunity, particularly in cases with severe human 
rights implications, leaving victims with no reliable or reasonable means of 
reparations.  Lastly, this retreat from restrictive jurisdiction could potentially 
have a huge effect on the United States’ Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
of 1976 (FSIA).182  The United States should take the lead in adopting 
legislation restricting immunity for gross violations of human rights because 
the potential implications are enormous. 
A.  Germany’s Insufficient and Incompetent Reparations and Foundation 
Germany’s efforts to make complete reparations were insufficient and 
dictated by the economic concerns of its large corporations.  While Germany 
was obligated to make reparations for victims after World War II, the 
London Agreement delayed reparations until peace was finalized.183  
Discussion on reparations was revived only after the “Two Plus Four” Treaty 
fashioned legal peace.184  Because Germany did not recognize forced laborers 
in their reparation settlements, private companies, such as Ford Werke and 
Bayer AG, faced immense class action suits, particularly in the United 
States.185   
To ease the strain of extensive litigation on private industry, Germany 
created the Foundation to be the exclusive remedy for any reparations 
claims.186  However, the Foundation was clearly insufficient, refusing to 
provide a real apology and requiring that participating companies only pay a 
maximum of 1% to 1.5% of their annual sales.187  These insufficiencies 
forced victims to try other avenues for reparations, catalyzing the line of 
Italian cases leading up to the ICJ case.188  Often victims are less concerned 
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with the monetary amount, than they are with having their case heard and 
their plight acknowledged.  By ignoring victims’ pain and suffering, 
Germany may have inadvertently encouraged litigation by those who still felt 
slighted.   
Additionally, Germany engaged in procedural technicalities to avoid 
compensating certain classes of victims.  The ICJ  
consider[ed] that it is a matter of surprise — and regret — that 
Germany decided to deny compensation to a group of victims 
on the ground that they had been entitled to a status which, at 
the relevant time, Germany had refused to recognize, 
particularly since those victims had thereby been denied the 
legal protection to which that status entitled them.189 
Hopefully, the ICJ’s surprise and regret will encourage action and lead to 
further reparations agreements to ensure that these severe human rights 
violations are addressed.  Even if Germany no longer feels morally 
responsible and does not feel the necessity of a sincere apology, it should 
still make reparations as an example for other countries.  The ICJ should not 
downplay human rights violations by not holding a country responsible. 
B.  The ICJ’s Failure to Recognize an Emerging Trend of Restrictive 
Immunity Leaves Victims with No Reliable Reparations 
By ignoring the current trend in national courts towards restrictive 
immunity, the ICJ leaves victims with no reliable means of reparations.  
International tribunals appear to have a more expansive view of sovereign 
immunity than national courts do, a phenomenon that can be seen, for 
example, in cases where the ECHR has refused to grant jurisdiction.190  
Nevertheless, these cases in the ECHR were decided by narrow majorities,191 
and the court recognized an international trend towards limiting sovereign 
immunity for civil claims caused by an act or omission in the forum state.192 
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Unfortunately, the ICJ did not take this opportunity to recognize this 
international trend and did not hold Germany liable for serious human rights 
violations.  By refusing to rule on a territorial tort exception,193 the ICJ 
effectively barred many victims from any recovery.  In CIL, the territorial 
tort principle works to hold insurance companies liable despite any claim of 
sovereign immunity by the foreign state.194  Even if the foreign country could 
claim sovereign immunity, it is not allowed to do so for a tort committed in 
the forum state if it carries insurance for that tort.  The ICJ refused to extend 
this tort exception to all civil claims by a foreign state in the forum 
country.195 
The territorial tort exception should be expanded to include un-insurable 
claims as well, in part because it would be absurd to require countries to 
carry “human rights insurance” like they carry vehicle insurance.  If 
countries were liable for human rights violations, there would be an incentive 
to create such an insurance pool.  However, not only would it be impossible 
to force every country to purchase such insurance, there would be no way to 
manage such a pool or enforce its obligations. 
In addition to difficulties of collecting from every country in the world, 
having an insurance program providing reparations for victims of human 
rights violations may create a moral hazard, allowing countries to commit 
whatever atrocities they desire without concern for the costs of future 
liability.  However, in spite of its shortcomings, a human rights violations 
insurance pool appears to be the only opportunity future victims will have for 
any reparations for torts committed by states in foreign territory.   
If a country knew that it would be liable for human rights violations, even 
its most vicious leaders may make more thoughtful decisions, not wanting to 
threaten their national economy or impose economic uncertainty on their 
national industry.  When industry faces uncertainty, particularly uncertainty 
involving large class action lawsuits, its value drops.  In an increasingly 
global and competitive market, companies need every advantage they can 
get.  Uncertainty from potential class action suits could upset a state’s 
corporations and have detrimental effects on the state’s economy.  Political 
leaders would most likely consider these economic effects when making 
decisions regarding human rights violations, as they want to preserve their 
economy and not threaten their companies’ global presence.196 
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The ICJ should have taken this opportunity to enunciate a bright-line rule 
abolishing sovereign immunity for gross human rights violations.  Although 
immunity may be seen as furthering “orderly international relations,” “it also 
blocks accountability and denies redress” to victims of violations of jus 
cogens.197  Opponents of a bright-line test may worry this would require the 
court to make a determination on the merits of whether the action at issue 
constitutes a gross human rights violation before granting jurisdiction and 
actually hearing the case.  This would mean that a court might spend a long 
time determining the facts of the case and whether there was a gross human 
rights violation only to discover that it lacked jurisdiction.  An easy way to 
fix this problem would be to allow individuals to bring a case directly before 
the ICJ or establish another forum for  victims of human rights violations, 
especially for cases where the violations are obvious and admitted by the 
perpetrating state (as in this case, where Germany admitted its liability).198  
Because victims are not allowed to bring a case individually before the ICJ, 
they are forced to rely on their country to do so.  This puts too much power 
in the hands of the country, rather than the victims who suffered.  There is no 
reason why victims should be denied reparations for gross human rights 
violations, particularly where the perpetrating state has admitted its error but 
taken insufficient action for reparations.  The international community 
should not support such failures. 
C.  Because of the ICJ’s Ruling, the FSIA May Be in Jeopardy and the 
United States Should Take the Lead in Protecting Victims of Human Rights 
Violations 
The United States should take the lead in protecting individuals from 
human rights violations by amending the FSIA to include such violations.  
As a result of the ICJ’s decision not to restrict sovereign immunity, the U.S. 
FSIA may be in jeopardy because it restricts foreign states’ sovereign 
immunity for tortious acts or omissions that occur in the United States.199  
The FSIA denies foreign states immunity from suits seeking damages for a 
tortious act or omission resulting in personal injury, death, or damage to or 
loss of property occurring in the United States.200  Additionally, in 1996 the 
United States amended the FSIA to include the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act, which provides further exceptions to sovereign immunity, 
stating: 
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a foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of 
courts of the United States . . . in which money damages are 
sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that 
was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft 
sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support 
or resources for such an act. . . .201 
The language in both these sections seems outside the scope of immunity 
provided for by the ICJ and could easily be classified as a territorial tort 
exception for un-insurable claims, which was not allowed in this case.  If 
American citizens had been deported by a foreign state and forced to live in 
horrendous conditions while performing slave labor, those victims could 
bring a claim in the United States under the FSIA.   
It is also interesting to note that in 1789 the United States enacted the 
Alien Tort Statute, which provides jurisdiction in the United States for any 
civil action brought by an alien for a tort committed “in violation of the law 
of nations [(jus cogens)] or a treaty of the United States.”202  United States 
courts have, incorrectly, refused to extend an exception from immunity in 
cases of human rights violations.  By readdressing these rulings, the United 
States can take the lead in fighting gross human rights violations. Precedent 
for such a reevaluation already exists.  In 1985, a district court found that 
Congress implied an exception in the FSIA for violations of international law 
even though it was not explicitly stated.203  The Second Circuit also upheld 
an international law exception to the FSIA, was overturned by the Supreme 
Court in Argentine Republic Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.204  The Supreme 
Court held the FSIA was intended to be comprehensive and did not include 
an international law exception.205  The Ninth Circuit considered whether 
there should be a jus cogens exception to sovereign immunity for torture 
under the commercial exception of the FSIA.206  Even though the court 
appeared to want to impose liability on Argentina, it was constrained by the 
Amerada case and unable to deny Argentina sovereign immunity despite the 
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fact that a torture allegation was more serious than the international law rules 
discussed in Amerada.207 
Unfortunately, United States courts are still constrained by the Amerada 
rule and construe the FSIA to grant immunity to a foreign state, even when it 
violates CIL.  Congress contemplated a “human rights exception” to the 
FSIA,208 but all the bills creating a sovereign immunity exception to the FSIA 
for human rights violations, either at home or abroad, were defeated.209  The 
legislative branch needs to take a stand in this area as it alone can change the 
status quo.  Congress needs to pass an amendment to the FSIA prohibiting 
violations of human rights that amount to breaches of jus cogens.  Congress 
already refuses to grant sovereign immunity when the tort occurs in the 
United States, so it is only common sense that there should be no immunity 
for such acts if they occur outside the United States.210  For example, an 
Italian citizen injured by Germans in the United States deserves no less 
protection than an Italian citizen injured by Germans in Italy.  Congress 
should address the Amerada decision and should amend the FSIA to deny 
foreign states sovereign immunity for torts and human rights violations that 
they commit outside the United States. 
The potential implications of granting sovereign immunity for gross 
violations of human rights are enormous.  Essentially, countries are given 
free rein to invade other countries, commit gross human rights violations, 
and then claim sovereign immunity if their victims ever try to hold them 
responsible.  For example, would anyone allow the United States to get away 
with enslaving Iraqis during Operation Iraqi Freedom and then denying those 
victims reparations for those injustices?  The international community would 
be up in arms if that were to happen.  Why is it acceptable for Germany 
during World War II but not the United States in the Iraq War?  While 
liability must cease at some point, all countries should be held to the same 
standards, particularly when it comes to jus cogens. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The United States must take a stand in front of the global community and 
deny sovereign immunity to states that have committed gross violations of 
human rights.  Unfortunately the ICJ did not seize its opportunity to follow 
the current CIL trend and create precedent by allowing civil claims to be 
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brought against Germany in other states for atrocities committed in those 
states by the Third Reich.  Germany has not made proper reparations over 
sixty years after the fact and punishment is long overdue.  Holding Germany 
liable will act as a deterrent against future human rights violations.  Martha, 
and others like her, should have an opportunity for compensation for the 
great wrongs they have suffered. 
